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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 990873-CA 
CHARLES K. LEATHERBURY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State/Appellant's opening 
brief, the State submits the following argument in reply to the first point contained in 
defendant/appellee's responsive brief. 
ARGUMENT 
NEITHER THE SIGNED MINUTE ENTRY NOR THE 
SUBSEQUENTLY-FILED FINDINGS CONSTITUTED A FINAL 
APPEALABLE ORDER TRIGGERING THE TIME FOR FILING AN 
APPEAL; THIS COURT'S JURISDICTION FLOWS FROM THE 
TIMELY FILING OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL THREE DAYS AFTER 
ENTRY OF A WRITTEN FINAL ORDER DISMISSING THE CASE 
For purposes of this argument, the following dates are pertinent: 
June 21,1999 Signed minute order is entered dismissing the case and ordering 
defense counsel to preparing findings of fact and conclusions of 
law (R. 104) (in Add. A). 
July 26,1999 Findings and conclusions are signed by the judge (no entry date 
appears on the document) (R. 106-10) (in Add. B). 
Sept. 20,1999 Signed written order of dismissal is entered (R. 111 -12) (in Add. 
C). 
Sept. 23, 1999 Notice of Appeal is filed (R. 113-14). 
Defendant argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the notice 
of appeal was not timely filed after the signed minute entry was filed. He claims that the 
signed minute entry was a final appealable order that fully adjudicated the parties' rights and 
that the trial court did not contemplate the filing of an additional order. Br. of Aplt. at 11 -17. 
Alternatively, he argues that once the written findings called for by the minute entry were 
filed, the parties' rights were fully adjudicated and the time for filing an appeal began to run. 
Id. at 17-18. The State's failure to file its notice of appeal until fifty-one days later, he 
claims, prevented this Court from acquiring jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Id Defendant's 
arguments, however, do not withstand scrutiny. 
A. The Signed Minute Entry was not a Final Appealable Order Because it Clearly 
Intended that Further Action be Taken and it was Devoid of Necessary Findings 
In appropriate circumstances, "a signed minute entry may be a final order for purposes 
of appeal." Swenson Associates Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 417 (Utah 1994) 
(emphasis in original). This is so, however, "only where 'the ruling specifies with certainty 
a final determination of the rights of the parties and is susceptible of enforcement.5" Id. 
(quoting Cannon v. Keller. 692 P.2d 740, 741 n.l (Utah 1984)). "It must be clear that that 
'which is offered as the record of a judgment is really such and not an order for a judgment 
or a mere memorandum from which the judgment was to be drawn.'" Swenson. 889 P.2d at 
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417 f quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Clegg. 103 Utah 414, 420, 135 P.2d 919, 
922 (1943)) (additional quotations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has found that a signed minute entry which announces the 
ultimate decision of the court and then provides that one party is to prepare a written order 
reflecting that decision-which order is ultimately signed and entered-is not a final appealable 
order. Swenson. 889 P.2d at 417. Cf. Sheta v. Grahm. 156 Cal.App.2d 77, 80, 318 P.2d 
756, 758 (1957) (citation omitted) (where findings of fact or a further or formal order is 
required, an appeal should not lie from a minute entry). Further, the Court has found that a 
signed minute entry providing "that judgment be entered against the plaintiff and in favor of 
the defendant" was not a final order because, among other things, it was obvious from the 
language that "something more was contemplated by the court." Hartford. 135 P.2d at 922. 
The language of the signed minute entry in this case unmistakably demonstrates that 
the court did not intend the minute entry to be a final judgment, but contemplated further 
action. The minute entry reads: 
Defendant's motion to dismiss heard, [argument] by [defense counsel]. 
Argument by [the prosecutor]. 
Court finds in favor of the defendant and orders the case dismissed. 
[Attorney for defendant] to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(R. 104-05) (audio tape markings omitted). 
The brief, almost cryptic, language of the minute entry amounts to no more than an 
"order for a judgment" and, therefore, does not amount to a final order. Swenson, 889 P.2d 
at 417. The minute entry makes no attempt to explain the dismissal. Instead, it merely 
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announces the ultimate decision of the court and directs the filing of findings and conclusions 
to explain the reasons for the dismissal and the logic of the court, as was the case in 
Swenson. The language unequivocally demonstrates that the trial court anticipated the 
preparation and filing of additional documentation necessary to complete the case. This is 
reinforced by the fact that the trial court later signed and entered both the findings and the 
subsequent written order-acts which would have no meaning if the court intended that its 
minute entry was the final appealable order. Accordingly, the signed minute entry in this 
case was not intended to be a final appealable order. Cf. Brice v. Department of Alcoholic 
Bev. Control. 153 Cal.App.2d 315, 314 P.2d 807 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1957) (even if findings 
were not legally required, minute entry noting that findings were to be prepared clearly 
demonstrated that the court contemplated further action, preventing the minute entry from 
being an appealable order). 
In addition, findings of fact and conclusions of law, "when appropriate," are required 
before an order may be deemed "final." Ahlstrom v. Anderson. 728 P.2d 979, 979 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam). Rule 25, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, makes the findings 
"appropriate" in this case. Rule 25 governs dismissal of criminal matters without trial and 
provides that "[t]he reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and entered 
in the minutes." Utah R. Crim. P. 25(c). The minute entry in this case is devoid of any 
suggestion as to why the trial court dismissed the case. Instead, the minute entry expressly 
provides for the later filing of findings and conclusions. Consequently, the findings are 
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"appropriate" and, hence, required because they provide the requisite reasons for the 
dismissal in this case. 
Not only are the detailed findings necessary to meet the requirements of rule 25(c), 
but they are also necessary for full appellate review of the trial court's dismissal. Without 
them, this Court cannot know the basis of the dismissal and whether it was justified. See Salt 
Lake Citv v. Hanson. 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967). Neither can the losing party 
properly frame its challenge to the trial court's ruling on appeal. 
Further, although the dismissal announced in the minute entry reflected the ultimate 
determination of the case, it did not fully adjudicate the facts underlying the decision where 
it provided no such facts. Factual findings which provide the basis for dismissal of the case 
reflect the rights of the parties in relationship to the dismissal order. The parties have a right 
to challenge the proposed findings before they become final, and the trial court can alter or 
amend the findings and/or its judgment as it becomes necessary. Utah R. Crim. P. 52(b); 
Utah R. App. P. 4(b): Reeves v. Steinfeldt. 915 P.2d 1073,1076(UtahApp. 1996). The trial 
court recognized the importance of the findings by ordering that they be prepared and filed. 
Accordingly, the signed minute entry did not represent a final determination of the parties' 
rights when it merely provided for dismissal of the case. 
B. Entry of the Findings of Fact did not Trigger the Time for Filing a Notice of 
Appeal Because the Findings did not Include a Final Order of Dismissai 
Defendant claims that if the filing of findings and conclusions is deemed necessary 
before an appeal may be perfected, then the time for filing the appeal began to run from the 
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date of entry of those findings. Br. of Aplt. at 17-18. However, defendant's argument that 
the written dismissal order is superfluous ignores the requirements of rule 25(c), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 25(c) requires that the reasons for the dismissal "be set forth in an order and 
entered in the minutes." Utah R. Crim. P. 25(c). To this end, findings and conclusions and 
a summary order of dismissal are usually combined in a single document in criminal cases, 
In this case, for whatever reason, defense counsel chose not to submit an order with the 
findings, which would have triggered the running of the time for filing an appeal. Neither 
do the findings incorporate the earlier minute entry announcing the dismissal. Consequently, 
the mere filing of the findings does not comply with rule 25(c). 
To comply with rule 25(c) and trigger the time to file an appeal, the prosecutor 
prepared a summary written order, incorporating the findings and ordering the dismissal. 
Defense counsel approved the order as to form, the court executed it, and it was entered in 
the record. This complies with all the requirements of rule 25(c). It also demonstrates that 
neither the court nor the parties regarded the findings as the "final judgment" for purposes 
of triggering the time for filing an appeal. See Swenson. 889 P.2d at 417. 
That the order was entered nearly two months after preparation of the findings may 
well have been due to the prosecutor's desire to provide defense counsel ample opportunity 
to complete the documentation necessary to effect the dismissal, inasmuch as the trial court 
had ordered defense counsel to do so. While the prosecutor could have filed a notice of 
6 
appeal at any time before or after entry of the findings and conclusions, the time for filing 
an appeal would not have commenced until entry of the written order incorporating the 
reasons for the dismissal pursuant to rule 25(c). See Utah R. App. P. 4(c). Hence, his 
failure to file an earlier notice is not fatal to this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal. 
Because neither the signed minute entry nor the subsequently-filed findings of fact 
constitute a final appealable order, neither document triggered the time for filing an appeal. 
Instead, that time commenced with entry of the final written order on September 20, 1999, 
and the notice of appeal, filed three days later, was timely and gave this Court jurisdiction 
over this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's dismissal of the case and remand the matter for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this l_ day of August, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES K LEATHERBURY, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
INCOURT NOTE 
Case No: 991400315 FS 
Judge: MATTHEW B. DURRANT 
Date: June 21, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: christen 
Prosecutor: MCCULLAGH, BRENDAN P 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): TORRENCE, DANIEL 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 8, 1970 
Audio 
Tape Number: 99160 Tape Count: 922 
CHARGES 
1. FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLIC - 3rd Degree Felony 
3. RECKLESS DRIVING - Class B Misdemeanor 
4. IMPROPER PLATE ON COMMON CARRIER - Class C Misdemeanor 
5. DRIVE ON DENIED LICENSE - Class C Misdemeanor 
6. FALSE PERSONAL INFORMATION TO P/O - Class C Misdemeanor 
HEARING 
TAPE: 99160 COUNT: 945 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS HEARD, BY DANIEL TORRENCE. 
COUNT: 1746 
ARGUMENT BY MR. MCCULLAGH. 
COUNT: 3377 
COURT FINDS IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND ORDERS THE CASE 
Page 1 
Case No: 991400315 
Date: Jun 21, 1999 
DISMISSED. 
ATD TO PREPARE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Dated this <3( day of . 19 
*v*dU— 
STAMRftJSED 
Page 2 ( last ) 
Addendum B 
DANIEL M. TORRENCE (#7652) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
CHARLES K. LEATHERBURY, Case No. 901906405 
Defendant. JUDGE MATTHEW B. DURRANT 
The Defendant, CHARLES K. LEATHERBURY, by and through counsel, DANIEL 
M. TORRENCE, filed a Motion to Dismiss on or about June 10, 1999. The grounds for the motion 
were that more than 120 days had passed since Defendant's 120-day Request for Disposition was 
received by the prison warden and the state had not brought the case to trial. The State opposed the 
motion. The Court requested and received memoranda from both parties. After a hearing on June 
21, 1999, the Court granted Defendant's motion. 
The Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 14, 1999, Charles K. Leatherbury was arrested and booked into jail. The 
charges included Fleeing a Peace Officer and several other charges. 
1 
2. Because Mr. Leatherbury was on parole from Utah State Prison at the time, he was 
returned to prison. 
3. Utah State Troopers investigated the alleged crimes and prepared a No-Warrant Arrest 
Fact Sheet, Incident Report, Supplementary Fact Sheet, Vehicle Inventory Form, 
Traffic Accident Form, Vehicle Seizure Form, Evidence Log, Vehicle Pursuit 
Memorandum, and Pursuit Data Collection Form. The District Attorney also obtained 
Mr. Leatherbury's vehicle and registration information, FBI Criminal History Record, 
and Utah Criminal History Record. 
4. Using this information, the District Attorney prepared a detailed, four page Information 
containing six counts, including Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal to Stop, 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Reckless Driving, License Plate/Registration 
Violation, Driving on Suspended/Denied License, and False Identity to a Peace Officer. 
5. On February 2, 1999, the Information was signed by the Deputy District Attorney and 
authorized for presentment and filing. 
6. On February 8, 1999, Sgt. Mary Brockbrader, the Authorized Agent in the DIO 
Record Unit at the Utah State Prison, received a copy of Mr. Leatherbury's Notice 
and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges. 
7. Within a few days, Sgt. Brockbrader mailed the Notice and Request for Disposition to 
the Salt Lake County District Attorney. 
8. The Information was filed with the Clerk of the District Court on March 26, 1999. 
9. Mr. Leatherbury made his initial appearance in court on April 7, 1999; he attended a 
roll call hearing on April 22, 1999; his preliminary hearing was held May 20, 1999. 
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10. At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Leatiierbury was oouna over tor trial on Counts I, III, 
IV, V, and VI. Count II was dismissed. Trial was scheduled for June 22, 1999. 
11. One hundred and twenty days after February 8, 1999 (the date Sgt Brockbrader 
received the Request for Disposition) was June 8, 1999. By that date, the State had not 
brought Mr. Leatherbury to trial. 
12. Mr. Leatherbury asked for no continuances and did nothing to cause any delay in 
bringing the case to trial. The State sought no continuances of the trial date. 
13. On June 10, 1999, Mr. Leatherbury *s attorney filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
Bring to Trial within 120 days. 
14. Judge Matthew B. Durrant granted Mr. Leatherbury's motion on June 21, 1999 
following oral argument and the receipt of memoranda from both parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The relevant statute is the Prisoner's Demand for Disposition of Pending Charge 
statute, U.C.A. 77-29-1, (the "disposition statute" or "detainer statute"), which provides: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or 
other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against the 
prisoner in this state any untried indictment or information, and the prisoner shall 
deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent 
of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein 
it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to 
have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written 
notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand described in 
subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal 
delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate prosecuting 
attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall, upon request of 
the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney with such information 
concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
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(3) After written demand is delivered as required in subsection (1), the prosecuting 
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such 
continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the 
action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that the failure of the 
prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the time required is not supported 
by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court 
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
U.C.A. 77-29-1. 
1. Mr. Leatherbury was serving a term of incarceration at Utah State Prison at all 
relevant times. 
2. Mr. Leatherbury complied with the disposition statute by delivering to the warden's 
agent a written demand entitled NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF 
PENDING CHARGES requesting disposition of pending charges. 
3. Thereafter, the burden of bringing the case to trial rested solely on the prosecutor; 
neither the defendant nor his counsel had any duty to inform the court or the prosecutor 
of the Request for Disposition. 
4. The language of the disposition statute requires that, in order to begin the 120-day 
disposition period, the "untried" Information be "pending." It does not require the 
Information to have been "filed." 
5. Mr. Leatherbury's 120 day disposition period thus began to run on February 8, 1999, 
the day the warden's agent received the Request for Disposition, even though the 
Information was not filed until some six weeks later. 
6. Once the Information was signed by a Deputy District Attorney for presentment and 
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filing, the District Attorney had sufficiently investigated its case and had actual notice 
of all the charges it intended to bring against Mr. Leatherbury; thus, the Information 
was "pending" for purposes of the disposition statute. 
7. Because the State had not brought Mr. Leatherbury to trial by June 8, 1999, 120 days 
after the warden's agent received the Request for Disposition, and because Mr. 
Leatherbury did nothing to delay the setting of his case for trial, and because the State 
failed to show "good cause" for its delay, Mr. Leatherbury was entitled to have the 
charges against him dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 2^day of ~ ^ L 1999. 
Third D i » ^ ^ u r t > 
s26davof J^lv 1999. X l l ? ^ Presented th is^r l day of 
DANIEL M. TORRENCE (#7652) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Approved as to form; notice^fp'resentation waived: 
Brendan McCulto 
Deputy Distru^Attorney # _ ^ £ ^ 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the District Attorney's Office, 2001 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 this day of , 1999. 
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Addendum C 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
BRENDAN P. MCCULLAGH, 7251 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
Telephone: (801)468-4322 
995BP20 fl*l"-C& 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SANDY DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
CHARLES K. LEATHERBURY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 991400315FS 
Hon. Matthew B. Durrant 
The Court, for the reasons given in The Findings of Fact and Conclusions law already 
entered, hereby enters this Order dismissing the above captioned case. 
DATED this 17th day of September, 1999. 
BY THE COtflO** U fyi^v 
Approved as to form 
-%>v 
Daniel M. Torrence 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 991400315FS 
Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Of Dismissal was 
delivered to Daniel M. Torrence, Attorney for Defendant Charles K. Leatherbury, at 424 East 
500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the day of September, 1999. 
